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Abstract 
Although prior research suggests that disabled employees have different needs in the context of 
some human resource management (HRM) practices, we know little about their reactions to 
reward systems. We address this gap in the literature by testing a model using the 2011 British 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (disabled employees n=1,251; nondisabled employees 
n=9,959; workplaces n=1806) and find that disabled employees report lower levels of pay 
satisfaction than nondisabled employees, and when compensated based on individual 
performance, the difference in pay satisfaction is larger. We suggest that relational (derived from 
trust in management) and institutional (derived from firm-wide policies and HRM practices, both 
intended to provide equitable treatment to disabled employees) forms of trust play important 
roles. The results of multilevel analyses show that when trust in management is high, the 
difference in pay satisfaction under variable pay is reduced. We find just the opposite for 
employees who work in organizations with a formal disability policy but without supportive 
HRM practices; the gap in pay satisfaction is exacerbated. However, the combination of the 
presence of a firm-wide policy and HRM practices reduced the difference in pay satisfaction. 
Implications of the findings for theory, future research, and management practice are discussed. 
 
Keywords: disability policy; disability status; HRM practices; individual variable pay; 
institutional trust; multilevel modelling; pay satisfaction; relational trust; trust in management
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Disability status, individual variable pay, and pay satisfaction:  
Does relational and institutional trust make a difference? 
A priority for organizations today is attracting, engaging, and retaining a diverse 
workforce (e.g., Konrad, Yang, & Maurer, 2016). This is because increased diversity can lead to 
a better understanding of local markets and customers, a greater ability to attract and retain 
talent, increased creativity, problem solving, and flexibility for organizations (e.g., Cox & Blake, 
1991; Subeliani & Tsogas, 2005). Although numerous scholars in human resource management 
(HRM) have examined work-related factors that lead various demographic groups to be satisfied 
at work (Ariss, Vassilopoulou, Özbilgin, & Game, 2013; Cooke & Xiao, 2014; Kooij, Jansen, 
Dikkers, & De Lange, 2010), far fewer have focused on those who are disabled, or are impaired 
in a way that limits their activity, yet allows for gainful employment (Stone & Colella, 1996; 
Theodorakopoulos & Budhwar, 2015). Understanding factors that are associated with the 
satisfaction of disabled employees is important given that disabled individuals constitute an 
underutilized labor pool, they have the potential to bring about the aforementioned benefits of 
diversity, and in most cases, are just as able and motivated to be successful at work relative to 
their nondisabled counterparts (Ali, Schur, & Blanck, 2011; Lengnick-Hall, Gaunt, & Kulkarni, 
2008; Schur, Nishii, Adya, Kruse, Bruyere, & Blanck, 2014).  
Despite this potential, research shows that disabled employees earn less than equally 
qualified, nondisabled employees (Gunderson & Lee, 2016; Hallock, Jin, & Barrington, 2014; 
Longhi, Nicoletti, & Platt, 2012). The starting point of this research therefore, is an examination 
of disabled versus nondisabled employees’ pay satisfaction, that is, the “amount of overall 
positive or negative affect (or feelings) that individuals have toward their pay” (Miceli & Lane, 
1991, p. 246). We expect that disabled employees have lower levels of pay satisfaction because, 
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according to equity theory, individuals are dissatisfied when their work inputs (i.e. education, 
tenure, performance) are incommensurate with their work outcomes (i.e. income), compared to 
similar (nondisabled) others (Adams, 1963).  
A potential key to facilitating the pay satisfaction of disabled employees is specific HRM 
practices, such as reward systems. In the present study, we examine the attitudinal responses of 
disabled versus nondisabled employees to a specific type of reward practice: individual variable 
pay. Disregarding disabled employees’ reports of HRM practices and their pay satisfaction may 
expose organizations to legal action, given that it is illegal in most countries to discriminate 
against a person because of a disability. Further, pressure is mounting for organizations to report 
disability-related statistics in non-financial business reports in order to comply with legal 
regulations and/or to showcase socially responsible behavior (e.g., Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 2016; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2016; 
European Commission, 2014). Disabled employees who are dissatisfied are likely to leave their 
organizations, thereby casting a negative light on them. Furthermore, paying attention to the 
unique needs of disabled employees is likely to contribute to a diversity climate which is 
positively associated with organizational commitment, identification and retention for all 
employees (e.g., Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009). In short, organizations have a vested interest – aside 
from “doing the right thing” – to ensure that disabled employees respond positively to their pay.  
An additional reason that we focus on disabled employees’ attitudinal reaction to 
individual variable pay is because there is theoretical reason to believe that disabled employees 
may respond differently to individual variable pay compared to nondisabled employees. Theory 
and research on factors affecting the treatment of disabled employees posit that disabled people 
tend to be negatively stereotyped and therefore may experience discrimination in performance 
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evaluations (Legnick-Hall et al., 2008; Smith, Webber, Graffam, & Wilson, 2004; Stone & 
Colella, 1996). Consequently, disabled employees may believe that individual variable pay 
systems are unfair and report lower satisfaction with their pay.  
However, there may be factors in the work environment that mitigate against the negative 
relationship between individual variable pay and pay dissatisfaction. Identifying these factors is 
crucial for organizations who wish to employ, engage, and retain disabled employees. We posit 
that two forms of trust might make a difference. The first, relational trust, refers to expectations 
that another party will act in good faith (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Sitkin & 
Roth, 1993). We develop theoretical arguments that an indication of relational trust – trust in 
management – may narrow the gap in pay satisfaction between disabled and nondisabled 
employees under variable pay. This is because disabled employees who trust in management 
believe that the system that underpins variable pay allocation is fair.  
The second form of trust is called institutional trust, and it is based on expectations that 
another party will abide by formal policies and practices that protect those in the relationship 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). In the present study, this form of trust is 
operationalized in two ways: the presence of (1) a firm-level policy and (2) HRM practices, both 
of which are aimed at ensuring that disabled employees are treated fairly. A distinction between 
policy and practice is imperative, as a disability-related policy without supporting HRM 
practices is likely to be insufficient, and may even backfire (Hill, 2009; Hoque & Noon, 2004). 
This is because the organizational rhetoric does not match the realities in practice. However, 
when HRM practices are in place to support the policy, then our model predicts that the gap in 
pay satisfaction under variable pay will decrease. Figure 1 depicts our theoretical model.  
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This study presents a number of contributions to the literature. We examine, for the first 
time, employee responses to a specific HRM practice – individual variable pay – by disability 
status, thereby addressing a call to understand diverse employees’ reactions to HRM practices 
(Theodorakopoulos & Budhwar, 2015). Moreover, this study serves as a contribution because it 
examines the moderating roles of two forms of trust. This advances three lines of scholarly 
thought. First, the bulk of research on trust in organizational settings examines trust solely at the 
micro-level (Bachmann, 2011; Fuglsang & Jagd, 2015) and the underlying assumption is that 
“more is better.” In the present study, we examine both the micro and macro levels, and we 
present theoretical arguments that policies that aim to build institutional trust may not always 
lead to their intended outcomes, particularly in the absence of aligned HRM practices. Second, 
this study advances theoretical models of disability management. Although Stone and Colella’s 
(1996) theoretical framework includes formal policy as a positive predictor of the fair treatment 
of disabled employees, very little research has examined disabled employees’ responses to 
policy, or considered that policy may backfire. Finally, the (in)effectiveness of formal policy is 
also of great interest to HRM scholarship, as theoretical models imply that the benevolent 
intentions underpinning some policies translate into positive outcomes (e.g., Bowen & Ostroff, 
2004; Guest, 1987), which may not always be the case. Our research sends a particularly strong 
message to practitioners. We show a way for organizations to optimize the benefits of individual 
variable pay, while increasing the likelihood that all employees – regardless of disability – are 
satisfied with their pay. 
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Disability status and pay satisfaction 
Equity theory holds that when employees’ inputs (i.e. education, skills, performance) do 
not match their outcomes (i.e. income) in relation to comparable others, individuals develop a 
sense of unfairness and become dissatisfied (Adams, 1963). Research shows that disabled 
employees earn less income relative to their nondisabled counterparts, even after controlling for 
variables such as quality of the job, tenure and actual performance (Gunderson & Lee, 2016; 
Hallock et al., 2014; Longhi et al., 2012). Moreover, the gap in income between disabled and 
nondisabled employees does not narrow over time (Woodhams, Lupton, Perkins, & Cowling, 
2015). Disabled employees may have lower pay because employers hold persistent stereotypes 
of disabled people, promoting negative expectations of their abilities and attributes, which in 
turn, influences performance reviews (e.g., Gunderson & Lee, 2016; Lengnick‐Hall et al., 2008; 
Ren, Paetzold, & Colella, 2008). When they have similar inputs (i.e. tenure, performance), but 
different outcomes (i.e. income) from nondisabled employees, disabled employees are likely to 
be dissatisfied.  
Only two studies, to our knowledge, have examined the effect of disability status on pay 
satisfaction. Witte, Philips, and Kakela (1998) found that 55 learning-disabled college graduates 
of one university in Miami were less satisfied with their pay compared with a matched 
nondisabled control group. McAfee and McNaughton (1997) collected survey responses from 
236 disabled employees in the USA; the average pay satisfaction was 3.53 out of 9.0; no 
comparison was made with nondisabled employees. We provide a constructive replication using 
a more recent and larger sample, in a different country, controlling for important variables that 
may influence this relationship (i.e. income, tenure, organization size etc.), with a comparison of 
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nondisabled employees. Based on equity theory and corroborating empirical research, we 
hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1: Disabled employees are less satisfied with their pay compared to 
nondisabled employees.   
The moderating role of individual variable pay  
Individual variable pay, by definition, refers to pay that is contingent on individual 
performance. Although variable pay includes a variety of types of incentives, including piece-
rate, gainsharing, profit sharing, stock plans and other hybrids (Lawler, 2000), in the present 
study, we focus on pay based on individual performance or output. Moreover, we focus on 
employees’ subjective reports of individual variable pay, rather than firm-level reports of 
variable pay. This is because HRM practices are likely to have consequences for employees’ 
attitudes to the extent that they are perceived by employees (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Kehoe & 
Wright, 2010) and research shows that employees’ perceptions of HRM practices vary 
significantly from managerial reports of them (Liao, Toya, Lepak, & Hong, 2009).  
Proponents of individual variable pay programs argue that they offer organizations a way 
to increase motivation and performance, and attract and retain high performers. Hence, it comes 
as no surprise that they are used by 88% of organizations in the USA, 80% in Canada, and 85% 
in the United Kingdom (Hewitt Salary Increase Survey, 2009). Woodhams et al. (2015) pointed 
out that an underlying assumption is that individual variable pay systems are beneficial to all 
employees, or at least they are believed to have a neutral impact in relation to pay differentials 
between minority and nonminority groups. This is because in a meritocratic organization, each 
employee is judged on his or her achievements and efforts, regardless of non-job related 
individual factors (Castilla & Benard, 2010). Ceteris paribus, individual variable pay systems 
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should lead employees to believe that they are treated in a fair and consistent manner. However, 
the claim that individual variable pay systems are blind to individual differences, such as 
disability status, is highly suspect.  
Our arguments are based on the fact that, in most cases, supervisors play an instrumental 
role in measuring the performance of employees, typically by way of a performance appraisal 
(Elvira & Graham, 2002; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). This may be problematic, as research 
shows that there is variability in employee beliefs regarding the validity of the assessment 
method used by managers to determine the distribution of individual variable pay (e.g., Gupta, 
1980). Indeed, employees often believe that factors aside from performance, such as seniority, 
nepotism, discrimination, and/or politics, are responsible for how managers calculate individual 
variable pay (Gupta & Jenkins, 1996; Gupta & Shaw, 1998).  
These beliefs are not unfounded. Theoretical models of pay decision-making emphasize 
that rather than recalling specific, observable behaviors, managers tend to recall an overall 
impression of an employee (e.g., DeNisi & William, 1998). In doing so, managers employ a 
number of cognitive schemas in making judgements about performance. Personal characteristics 
and observed behaviors are used to place employees into categories, and information that is 
inconsistent with the category is discounted whereas more weight is placed on information that 
confirms it. As Campbell and Lee (1988, p. 305) stated, “once categorized, the employee’s 
appraisal is as much a function of the evaluator’s belief about how a typical individual in that 
category performs as it is a function of his or her actual performance.” Despite their popularity, 
individual variable pay schemes have been criticized in relation to their fairness, since their 
subjectivity gives expression to pre-existing stereotypes (e.g., Castilla & Benard, 2010; Elvira & 
Graham, 2002).  
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Supervisors’ reliance on stereotypes may be especially pronounced for employees who 
are disabled. To the extent that disability status is a salient personal characteristic, it is used as a 
basis for categorization (Colella, DeNisi, & Varma, 1997). Although equality legislation in the 
UK (where the data for our study is sourced) has brought about more positive attitudes toward 
disabled people, negative public perceptions are still pervasive. For instance, Aiden and 
McCarthy (2014) reported that two-thirds of the UK population felt uncomfortable talking to 
disabled people and Staniland (2011) found that nearly 8 out of 10 respondents in the UK felt 
that there is either a lot or a little prejudice toward disabled people. 
Studies that have been conducted in the work domain show similar results; nondisabled 
individuals hold negative stereotypes about disabled individuals (e.g., incompetent, needy, 
embittered; Colella, 1996) and employers tend to believe that disabled employees perform less 
well than their nondisabled counterparts (Legnick-Hall et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2004) and have 
limited job skills (Jones, Gallagher, Kelley, & Massari, 1991; Legnick-Hall et al., 2008). 
Disabled employees may also be perceived as lacking person-job or person-organization fit, 
given that they are stereotyped as being unsuitable or incompetent for the job (Colella & Varma, 
1999; Ren et al., 2008). After realizing these misperceptions, disabled employees may believe 
that their performance evaluation and pay are unfair. Consistent with the tenants of equity theory 
(Adams, 1963), the perception of injustice is likely exacerbated under individual variable pay 
because disabled employees’ input-output ratio is larger than comparable nondisabled others, 
causing an increase in pay dissatisfaction.  
Another reason that variable pay may exacerbate the relationship between disability 
status and pay satisfaction is that disabled employees may view the entire pay system – 
regardless of management’s direct involvement in evaluating their performance – as biased 
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because it was created by more powerful, nondisabled people. Feminist theory suggests daily 
procedures and decisions lead to the development of hierarchies in which power lines based on 
gender, class, race, and disability are continuously reinforced through their reproduction (Acker, 
1990; Morris, 1991; Bê, 2012). The structuring persists through workplace practices that are 
embedded in unequal power divisions where the “ideal” organizational member (strong, 
courageous, forceful, virile, etc.) always wins (Kanter, 1977). The “micro processes and micro 
practices that are ‘underneath’ and constitutive of macro-social structural arrangements’ 
perpetuate the status quo” (Calas & Smircich, 1996, p. 228). In adopting this lens to disability, 
the same processes may occur in that the reward system, even if it is deemed entirely “objective” 
by those who are nondisabled, may lead disabled employees to believe that they are at a 
disadvantage, especially when the reward system was not developed with disabled employees’ 
unique needs in mind, or when disabled employees are not provided with the requisite reasonable 
adjustments. Hence, we hypothesize the following:   
Hypothesis 2: Individual variable pay moderates the relationship between disability status 
 and pay satisfaction, such that the difference in pay satisfaction between disabled and 
 nondisabled employees is larger with variable pay.  
Does relational and institutional trust make a difference?  
Trust is defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, 
p. 395). Scholars distinguish between two forms of trust. First, relational trust derives from 
repeated, positive interactions between two parties which give rise to positive emotions, such as 
care and concern. It is characterised by the exchange of valuable resources and high expectations 
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of the other party. The result is normally mutual loyalty and support (e.g., Rousseau et al., 1998; 
Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Zucker, 1986).  
Second, institutional trust refers to expectations that rely on formal controls, including 
formalized policies and practices. Whether instruments designed to increase institutional trust 
lead to wholly positive outcomes is debatable. On the one hand, institutional policies and 
practices can serve as a springboard for the creation of trust by signalling the values that underlie 
the rule or procedure. On the other hand, scholars have argued that rules or procedures designed 
to enhance institutional trust can lead to unintended, negative consequences (Rousseau et al., 
1998; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). In the present study, we argue that a way to understand the 
conflicting predictions of theory in the context of managing diversity in organisations is to take 
into account the alignment of policy with related practices. In particular, we propose that 
organizational policies without supporting HRM practices will be ineffectual in reducing the gap 
in pay satisfaction. Instead, organizational policies that are equipped with related HRM practices 
have the potential to narrow the pay-satisfaction gap.      
Trust in management. Management is the funnel through which employees receive and 
interpret HRM practices (e.g., Piening, Baluch, & Ridder, 2014). In the case of individual 
variable pay, managers must not only define the required standards of performance and behavior, 
they must also make decisions about rewards, communicate those decisions, and justify them 
when asked to do so. Employees who trust management may be more satisfied with their pay 
under an individual variable pay system because they trust that management is reliable, sincere, 
honest, and treats employees fairly. In the context of making individual variable pay decisions, 
management has an important role to play in creating a trusting environment, by providing 
opportunities for voice, treating employees with respect, and/or showing employees how their 
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performance translates into rewards (Chang, 2011; van Dijke, de Cremer, Bos, & Schefferlie, 
2009). Farndale and Kelliher (2013) found that employees who trust management are more likely 
to perceive that their manager treats them fairly during performance reviews. Hence, this form of 
relational trust is integral to ensuring that individual variable pay systems are perceived as fair, 
and contribute to employees’ pay satisfaction (Adams, 1963).  
Thus far, our theoretical argument for the moderating role of trust in management applies 
equally to disabled and nondisabled employees. In short, both should benefit from relational trust 
under individual variable pay. However, there is reason to believe that trust in management may 
be particularly important in influencing the pay satisfaction of disabled employees who are paid 
based on their performance.  
This reason is rooted in the cognitively demanding nature of making individual variable 
pay decisions. As previously discussed, managers hold negative stereotypes about disabled 
employees (Legnick-Hall et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2004) which may (un)intentionally 
downwardly bias their performance ratings. Moreover, supervisors tend to have lower 
expectations of disabled employees’ future performance, and are reluctant in recommending 
them for promotions (Colella & Varma, 1999; Ren et al., 2008). When managers are asked to 
make individual variable pay decisions, disabled individuals may fear that their manager relies 
on such stereotypes, and their decisions are not fair.  
Indeed, stereotype threat theory and associated research on stigma has shown that 
individuals tend to mistrust in domains in which their group is stereotyped (Cohen, Steele, & 
Ross, 1999; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Steele & Aronson, 1995). For example, an 
experimental study showed that participants who had a scar cosmetically (temporarily) applied to 
their face believed that an interaction partner behaved in an awkward and patronizing manner 
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toward them – even when the participants’ scars were removed without the participants’ 
knowledge prior to the interaction (Kleck & Strenta, 1980).  
However, extensions of stereotype threat theory suggest that individuals who are 
stigmatized do not always feel mistreated in stereotype-relevant contexts. Instead, studies 
demonstrate that work-related factors can reduce the likelihood that a person believes that others 
will negatively stereotype him or her in stereotype-relevant contexts (Emerson & Murphy, 2015; 
Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, Davies, Ditlmann, & Crosby, 2008). From this, we predict that trust in 
management is a work-related factor that has the capacity to reduce disabled employees’ beliefs 
that the performance management system, upon which variable pay is based, is biased. 
Specifically, we suggest that disabled individuals strongly value a trusting relationship with 
management because in a high trust situation, disabled employees believe that management 
avoids making stereotypical judgements of them. Compared with nondisabled employees, 
disabled individuals may require additional reassurance from management in order to feel that 
they are treated fairly. Indeed, disabled employees may believe that they need to work extra hard 
to develop a high quality relationship with their managers (Colella & Varma, 2001).  
In summary, we posit that disabled employees who have high trust in management will 
believe that pay decisions are made fairly under variable pay. Consistent with equity theory 
(Adams, 1963), this sense of justice will positively affect their pay satisfaction. In light of the 
above theory and evidence, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3:  There is a three-way interaction among trust in management, disability 
status and individual variable pay such that when trust in management is high, the difference in 
pay satisfaction between disabled and nondisabled employees under variable pay is reduced.  
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Disability policy and related HRM practices. The formal adoption of policies and 
practices that promote the fair treatment of disabled employees may demonstrate that the 
organization respects and provides equal opportunities to all (Schur, Kruse, & Blanck, 2005; 
Stone & Colella, 1996). Such policies and practices are capable of regulating employee behavior, 
defining what is appropriate and inappropriate (March, Schult, & Zhou, 2000), fostering 
coordination and control, and reducing discrimination by ensuring that employees are treated 
uniformly (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). In this sense, policies and practices may instil in employees the 
belief that they will be treated fairly, and in alignment with equity theory (Adams, 1963), pay 
satisfaction should increase because employees believe that they will be rewarded fairly.  
At first blush, “practice” and “policy” may seem similar enough not to warrant further 
investigation. The field of HRM tends to use the terms interchangeably, however, as Becker and 
Gerhart (1996) noted, it is oftentimes important to distinguish between the two. Although 
decision makers may have the best of intentions when formulating and communicating policy 
regarding the fair treatment of disabled employees, policies (without practices) may be 
ineffectual, or even trigger negative consequences. Indeed, policy may raise the expectations of 
employees; when there are limited HRM practices that follow policy, it may create 
disappointment and consequently dissatisfaction. Erikson, von Schrader, Bruyere, and VanLooy 
(2014) found that only one quarter to one half of organizations that have disability-related 
fairness policies stated that they are effective, and Dibben, James, Cunningham, and Smythe 
(2002) suggested that disability-related policies are oftentimes designed to promote a positive 
corporate image, and not necessarily as a means to employ, engage, and retain disabled 
employees. In their analysis of workplaces in Britain, Hoque and Noon (2004) concluded that 
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many equal opportunity policies are mere “empty shells.” This research points to the need to 
investigate not only formal policies, but also HRM practices that are aligned with it.  
HRM theory building has acknowledged that a gap can arise between espoused 
organizational policies relating to the management of people and the HRM practices that support 
them (Ezzamel, Lilley, Wilkinson & Wilmott, 1996; Truss, 2001). Similarly, notions arising 
from the Michigan School of thought include that HRM practices need to be congruent with 
organizational strategy (Fombrun, Tichy, & Devanna, 1984). As Gratton and Truss (2003) 
argued, “A key message is that the bridging from business goals to employee performance 
requires not only policies but also a determination to act, as seen through actual practice” (p. 75).  
There are only two studies, to our knowledge, that have examined the impact of firm 
policy with and without corresponding HRM practice in relation to disability management. 
Cunningham, James and Dibben (2004) presented findings from four organisations, each of 
which had a seemingly robust policy for managing ill or disabled employees. They identified 
factors that inhibited the ability of line managers to comply with formal policies, many of which 
included HRM practices (e.g., training). The second study was based on qualitative data of new 
graduate disabled employees in the UK; William (2016, p. 349) found that when disabled 
employees worked for an organization that had a specialist equality and diversity HR manager, 
they were better able to secure reasonable adjustments than when they were absent, “even when 
formal policies existed.” In fact, this research found that in organizations where there was a 
formal policy related to the provision of reasonable adjustment for disabled employees without 
corresponding HRM practices, adjustments were either difficult to achieve or failed altogether.  
Based on the above theoretical arguments and evidence, we assert that institutional trust 
in the form of policy alone has little consequence for reducing the gap in pay satisfaction. 
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Instead, it is only the combination of organization-wide policy and supportive HRM practices 
that will lead to a reduction in the pay satisfaction gap between disabled and nondisabled 
employees under variable pay.   
Hypothesis 4:  When a policy is combined with high level of HRM practices, the 
difference in pay satisfaction between disabled and nondisabled employees under 
variable pay is reduced. When a policy is combined with low level of HRM practices, the 
difference is increased.  
Method 
Sample  
The data was drawn from the British 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS). WERS 2011 is the sixth survey in a series of nationally representative surveys of 
British workplaces, and was conducted between March 2011 and June 2012. The survey 
population was workplaces that employed 5 or more people. Employees were randomly sampled 
from the list provided by the workplace, which covered 90% of all employees in Britain. The 
response rates were 46% for the workplace interviews, and 54% for employee questionnaires.  
We limited the sample to employees who provided valid answers to all the questions 
concerning this study and those who worked at least one year at the workplace so that we were 
able to ensure that they received individual variable pay, if they were entitled, and were familiar 
with the general management practices and behaviors. Doing so was particularly important given 
that trust in management and disability related polices feature in our model; trust develops over 
time as a function of the parties in a relationship having a history of interaction (Rousseau et al., 
1998) and employees need time to be familiar with organizational policies.  
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The final sample size was 11,210 employees in 1,806 workplaces. On average 6 
employees per organization, with a maximum of 23 and minimum of 1, are included in the final 
sample. Among the employees, 1,251 were disabled (11%). This number is slightly higher than 
8.8%, the percentage of employed disabled people in Britain, as reported by the Department of 
Work and Pensions (2014).  
Measures 
Individual variable pay  
Employees were asked: (1) “Do you receive payments based on your individual 
performance or output in your job here?” In our coding, 1 signifies that employees received 
individual variable pay during the past year; 0 signifies they did not receive individual variable 
pay in the past year.  
Disability status 
 We created a dummy variable from the question, “Are your day-to-day activities limited 
because of a health problem or disability which has lasted, or is expected to last, at least 12 
months?” Employees who answered ‘Yes, limited a little” and ‘Yes, limited a lot’ to this 
question were coded as 1, and those who answered ‘No’ were coded as 0. We took this approach 
because there were only 170 disabled employees who indicated that they were “limited a lot.” In 
order to ensure that we had adequate power for our analyses, and to reduce the chances for a 
Type 2 error, the two categories of “limited a little” and “limited a lot” were collapsed into one 
category. This question is similar to that used by Schur, Kruse, Blasi, and Blanck (2009), except 
that the time span of 6 months was extended to 12 months and “work, housework, or other major 
activities” was combined to “day-to-day activities.” 
Trust in management 
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We used a measure of trust in management as a proxy for relational trust. Employees 
were asked to indicate their agreement with six statements about their trust in management on a 
Likert-type scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The six statements are: “Now 
thinking about the managers at this workplace, to what extent do you agree that managers…(1) 
can be relied upon to keep to their promises; (2) are sincere in attempting to understand 
employees’ views; (3) deal with employees honestly; (4) understand about employees having to 
meet responsibilities outside work; (5) encourage people to develop their skills; and (6) treat 
employees fairly.”  
Results of an exploratory factor analysis showed that all six items belong to one latent 
variable—trust in management. All items have high factor loadings (above .74) and no items 
have high cross-loadings on other factors (the highest is .14). A scree test was performed by 
examining the graph of the eigenvalues. Oblique rotation showed that a one-factor model had the 
“cleanest” factor structure. Thus, trust in management was measured by taking the mean of the 
six responses. It has an alpha of 0.93. 
Disability Policy  
Employers were asked if their organization had a formal written policy that explicitly 
mentioned equality of treatment or discrimination on the ground of disability. It is coded as 1 if 
the employer answered ‘Yes’ to this question and 0 if the answer was ‘No.’  
Disability-Related HRM Practices 
Employers were asked the following five questions: do you (1) “monitor recruitment and 
selection by disability?”; (2) “review recruitment and selection by disability?”; (3) “monitor 
promotions by disability?” (4) “review promotion procedures by disability?” (5) “review relative 
pay rates by disability?”; We coded “Yes” as 1 and “No” as 0. The “disability-related HRM 
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practices” was an average index of five dichotomous variables with a reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach alpha) of 0.84.  
Pay satisfaction 
Employees were asked, “How satisfied are you with the amount of pay you receive?” on 
a scale that ranged from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). Nagy (2002) showed that a 
single-item measure of pay satisfaction is highly correlated with a multiple-item measure of pay 
satisfaction, and concluded that a single item facet-measure of pay satisfaction is adequate.  
Control variables  
At the individual level, we controlled for age (9 categories; range from 16-17 to over 65), 
income (14 categories; range from less than £60 per week to £1,5051 or more per week), and 
tenure (5 categories; range from less than one year to 10 years or more). We treated these three 
variables as continuous because they have interval properties (i.e. the distance between the 
categories has a consistent meaning). In addition, according to Rhemtulla, Brosseau-Liard, and 
Savalei (2012), when categorical variables have at least 5 categories, the results will not differ if 
they are treated as categorical or continuous. At the individual level, we also controlled for 
gender, marital status, education, whether they receive base pay or only commissions, and 
number of work hours per week. We included these controls because past research indicates that 
these variables are related to pay satisfaction (e.g., Berkowitz, Fraser, Treasure, & 
Cochran, 1987; Clark, 1996; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006). At the organization level, we controlled 
for organization size, union status, whether the organization had a job evaluation system, and 
whether the organizational representative stated that employees in the organization are paid 
based on merit. Prior research has shown that these too are related to satisfaction (e.g., Bender & 
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Sloane, 1998; Evans & Ondrack, 1990; Gius, 2013; Green, 1973; Green & Haywood, 2008; 
London, 1976).   
Common method bias  
 
The WERS design contains elements suggested by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and 
Podsakoff (2003; also see Chang, Van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010) for reducing the likelihood 
of common method bias. First, different scale points and anchors were used for different 
variables. Specifically, ‘pay satisfaction’ was measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
‘very satisfied’ to ‘very dissatisfied’ and ‘trust in management’ was measured on a 5-point scale 
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’; disability status was measured on a different 
scale anchor (i.e., ‘Yes’ and ‘No’); and individual variable pay was measured by asking the 
respondents to ‘tick’ the option if they received payments based on their individual performance 
or output. Second, there is a proximal separation of measures (i.e., the self-reported measures - 
disability status, pay satisfaction, individual variable pay, and trust in management - belonged to 
different sections of the employee survey) which reduces the likelihood of common retrieval 
cues to answer subsequent questions. Third, respondents were assured that their responses were 
confidential, which reduces the possibility of social desirability bias. Fourth, data was collected 
from multiple sources (i.e., HRM practices were provided by the management questionnaire and 
trust in management was provided by employees). Finally, the tested regression models included 
multiple interaction effects, which reduces the potential for common method bias as respondents 
are unlikely to anticipate difficult-to-visualize interactions.  
In addition to the above-mentioned strategies, we conducted Harman’s single-factor test 
in STATA by simultaneously loading all items in factor analysis with no rotation to check 
whether the data may be contaminated by common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The 
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results demonstrated that a single factor did not account for the majority of the covariance among 
the measures. Scholars suggest that if a single factor accounts for more than 50%, common 
method bias is likely a concern (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Farndale, Van Ruiten, Kelliher, & Hope-
Hailey, 2011). Our results showed that it explained only 40% of the total variance. Thus, 
common method bias does not unduly influence the results of our analyses.    
Analytical strategy 
WERS is an employer-employee linked survey. Employees who work in the same 
workplace are likely to be similar, given their shared experiences of workplace practices and 
culture. Because the data are multilevel (employees nested in firms), all the hypotheses were 
tested using hierarchical linear modelling. We analyzed the data using Stata command XTREG 
with random effects estimator (thereby allowing both the intercepts and slopes to vary by 
organization), which is a command in Stata to deal with multi-level data.  
Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among all of the variables. The 
number of hours that employees worked and income has a correlation of 0.61 and age and tenure 
has a correlation of 0.43. These are the highest correlations among all variables, and they are in 
the expected direction. The correlation between disability status and income is small yet 
negative; this is consistent with previous research which shows that disabled employees earn less 
income than nondisabled employees (Gunderson & Lee, 2016; Hallock et al., 2014; Longhi et 
al., 2012). Disability status is also positively related to age and tenure as well as negatively 
related to education. This indicates that disabled employees tend to be older, have more work 
experience and are less educated. These correlations are small, ranging from 0.04 to 0.14. At the 
organization level, disability status is correlated with organization size and union status. 
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Unionized and larger organizations have more disabled employees than nonunionized or smaller 
organizations. The correlations with gender suggest that women work fewer hours, earn less 
income, but are more satisfied with their pay. Individual variable pay was positively correlated 
with pay satisfaction. There is a nonsignificant relationship between disability status and 
individual variable pay; disabled employees are just as likely to be paid based on individual 
performance as nondisabled employees. 
Table 2 presents descriptive information of the firm characteristics that are germane to 
the present study. Notably most organizations in our sample have a formal written policy on 
equal opportunities or managing diversity (91%) but very few organizations have adopted related 
HRM practices. For example, only 10% of organizations review pay rates by disability and only 
18% of organizations monitor promotions by disability. 
------------------------------------------------ 
 INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents the multi-level regression results. Model 1 presents the control variables 
only. In model 2, the coefficient representing disability status is statistically significant and 
negative (B=-.18, SE=.04, p<.01). This shows that disabled employees are 0.18 points less 
satisfied with their pay than nondisabled employees. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------------- 
To test Hypothesis 2, we added individual variable pay and its product with disability 
status. As shown in model 3, the product variable is statistically significant and negative, and the 
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change in the R2 for the model is also significant. Figure 2 is the plot of the interaction effect and 
it demonstrates that disabled employees are less satisfied with their pay than nondisabled 
employees regardless of whether they received individual pay, but the gap is much larger under 
individual pay. The interaction coefficient (B=-.37, SE=.12, p<.01) in the regression suggests 
that, holding other predictors constants, the difference in pay satisfaction among disabled and 
nondisabled employees is 0.37 larger with individual variable pay than the difference without 
individual variable pay. Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported.  
To test Hypothesis 3, we ran a three-way interaction and the results are shown in model 
4; a comparison of the R2 statistics show that model 4 was a significant improvement over model 
3. The three-way interaction was significant (B=-.21, SE=.12, p<0.1). We plotted the three-way 
interaction effect of individual variable pay, disability status, and trust in management (i.e. one 
standard deviation above/below the mean) in Figure 3. The two-way interaction coefficient when 
trust in management is high is -.05. A Z-test shows that it is significantly different from the 
interaction coefficient in model 3 (Z=13.09, p<0.01), which indicates that when trust in 
management is high, the difference in pay satisfaction between disabled and nondisabled 
employees under variable pay and without variable pay is reduced by 0.32 point, and this 
reduction is statistically significant. Thus Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
To test Hypothesis 4, we ran a three-way interaction with observations that have a 
disability policy (disability policy = 1).  The results are shown in model 5; a comparison of the 
R2 statistics show that model 5 was a significant improvement over model 3. We plotted the 
interaction in Figure 4. The two-way interaction coefficient when the organization has a 
disability policy and HRM practice is high (-.24) indicates that when the organization has a 
disability policy and extensive disability-related HRM practices, the difference in pay 
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satisfaction between disabled and nondisabled employees under variable pay decreased by 0.13 
point. This supports Hypothesis 4. On the other hand, as our theoretical development suggested, 
the interaction coefficient when the organization has a disability policy and HRM practice is low 
is smaller than the one in model 3 (B=-.51): the difference in pay satisfaction between disabled 
and nondisabled employees under variable pay increased by 0.14 point. This shows that even 
when an organization has a disability policy in place, it alone fails to reduce the pay satisfaction 
and indeed backfires. The three way interaction has a coefficient of .28 and standard errors of 
.38, which is not statistically significant.  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
Our study responds to a call for more research on “understanding the differences in 
satisfaction among disabled employees” and “the identification of potential boundary conditions 
that moderate such job satisfaction differences, which can impact work outcomes” 
(Theodorakopoulos & Budhwar, 2015, p. 182). Our results show that disabled employees report 
lower levels of pay satisfaction, and this negative relationship was exacerbated under individual 
variable pay; the gap in pay satisfaction was larger when employees reported that they were paid 
based on individual performance. Although prior research has taken us a long way in 
understanding how HRM practices differentially impact disabled and nondisabled employees, 
our research contributes to both HRM and the workplace disability management literatures by 
showing that disabled employees are less satisfied with their pay, and even more so when they 
are paid based on individual performance.  
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Had we stopped our analysis at this point, the results may have contributed to employers’ 
reluctance to hire disabled people, especially in organizations where individual variable pay 
contributes to employees’ total rewards. However, we also found that trust in management 
makes a difference. In fact, the results show that the gap in pay satisfaction between disabled and 
nondisabled employees under variable pay was reduced by approximately 68% when trust in 
management is high. Hence, employees with disabilities may relish the opportunity to be paid 
based on their individual performance, so long as they trust that management is fair and 
unbiased.  
Our study also revealed that organizational policy combined with HRM practices 
decreased the gap in pay satisfaction by 35 percentage points. This finding is important for the 
field of HRM, as it shows that HRM practices that are aligned with a formal organizational 
policy has clear implications for the satisfaction of disabled employees. Conversely, the presence 
of a formal disability policy without corresponding HRM practices increased, rather than 
decreased the gap in pay satisfaction. Although organizations may have employees’ best interests 
at heart in instituting formal policy aimed to ensure the fair treatment of disabled employees, our 
analyses show that they have the potential to backfire when they are uncoupled from HRM 
practices that support it.  
The present study makes a significant contribution to the literature on the effects of trust 
in the workplace. The vast majority of theory and research on trust has been at the micro-level 
(Bachmann, 2011; Fuglsang & Jagd, 2015) and has focused on employees’ perceptions of trust in 
one’s manager, co-workers, or organization (e.g., Alfes, Shantz & Truss, 2012; Dirks & Ferrin, 
2002; Kong, Dirks & Ferrin, 2014). Very few studies have examined firm-wide policies, or other 
forms of institutional based trust, and conditions under which actions designed to enhance 
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institutional based trust may have unintended consequences (see Blatt, 2009; Bunderson & 
Boumgarden, 2010; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Michael, 2006 for exceptions). This is the first 
study, to our knowledge, to examine the effects of micro and macro forms of trust, and one of 
very few to directly investigate policy versus practice in relation to disability management 
practices (Hoque & Noon, 2002), and we therefore open the door for research on the effects of 
each individually and in concert.  
We also contribute to the workplace disability literature which shows that disabled versus 
nondisabled employees have different needs in the context of other HRM practices, including 
career management (Kulkarni & Gopakumar, 2014), socialization (Colella, 1994; Kulkarni & 
Lengnick-Hall, 2011), performance management (Colella, DeNisi & Varma, 1997), workplace 
accommodation (e.g., Schur et al., 2014) and recruitment and hiring (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2008; 
Smith et al., 2004). Our findings regarding relational and institutional trust also extend theory in 
this scholarly field. For instance, policies and practices feature in theory on the effective 
management of disabled employees as if the two are always mutually reinforcing (Stone & 
Colella, 1996). Our results show that a formal disability policy increased the gap in pay 
satisfaction between disabled and nondisabled employees under variable pay in the absence of 
supportive HRM policies, and hence theory on the antecedents of disabled employees’ reactions 
at work should note their differential effects.  
Finally, our findings contribute to the HRM literature in at least two ways. First, we show 
the importance of aligning firm–wide policy with HRM practices. The finding that actions that 
aim to build institutional trust can backfire contributes to perceptions of HRM theory, and 
debates on how firm-level HRM policies may not always have their intended effects (Piening et 
al., 2014; Shantz, Alfes, Arevshatian, & Bailey, 2016). Second, HRM scholars – especially those 
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who study compensation in particular – may find our study of interest through a different 
interpretation of the results of the moderating effects. It is possible to position our findings such 
that disability status is a moderator of the relationship between individual variable pay and pay 
satisfaction. Our results (Model 3, Table 3) show that individual variable pay has a positive 
effect on the pay satisfaction of nondisabled employees, lending support to prior research which 
shows the beneficial effects of individual variable pay (e.g., Green & Heywood, 2008; Heywood 
& Wei, 2006; Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006). However, the effect is reversed for 
disabled employees; when paid based on performance, the relationship between individual 
variable pay and pay satisfaction is negative for those who are disabled. The present study is the 
first to reveal empirical evidence regarding the moderating role of disability status on the 
relationship between variable pay and pay satisfaction, and therefore responds to calls for 
research on factors that reduce the effectiveness of variable pay (e.g., Drago & Garvey, 1998; 
Fernie & Metcalf, 1999; Marsden, French, & Kubo, 2001). 
Data Strengths and Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
The WERS provided us with a large sample of disabled people in the UK. As noted by 
Schur et al. (2005), the bulk of research on disability management is conducted in the laboratory 
and is assumed to generalize to the working population. They suggested that researchers should 
collect and analyse data from organizations to make accurate assessments about the responses of 
disabled people to work-related factors. Doing so, however, is difficult, as the number of 
disabled individuals in most organizations is relatively low. Our use of the 2011 WERS provided 
us with a sample of 1,251 disabled people, allowing us to make relatively confident conclusions 
with our data analysis. WERS has much to offer to researchers who focus on the work 
experiences of disabled people, as it can be used to assess the impact of specific HRM practices 
DISABILITY VARIABLE PAY TRUST 29 
on employee outcomes. Notwithstanding the strengths of using the WERS, it comes with a 
number of limitations, which lead us to propose a number of directions for future research.  
First, our empirical findings are based on cross-sectional data. Hence it is not possible to 
assert causal linkages amongst the variables. Moreover, the data is sourced from Britain, limiting 
the generalizability of our findings. For instance, the British government actively encourages 
employers to treat disabled people fairly (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2005). Organizations 
located in countries that place little legal or institutional pressure on organizations to integrate 
disabled people may yield different insights (Konrad et al., 2016). Our findings may also 
generalize less well to other countries because reactions to individual variable pay differ by 
national culture (e.g., Chang, 2011). Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine 
whether our results generalize to other “diverse” groups. Although disability, like race and 
gender, is a cultural construct that assigns traits to individuals on the basis of bodily individual 
differences, “the border between disabled and nondisabled is less permanent and more permeable 
than those between races and genders” (Couser, 2005, p. 97). Future research should therefore 
test our hypotheses using longitudinal designs in different national contexts, and with other 
social formations that emerge from interactions of disability, gender, race, class, and others.  
Second, we could not parcel out the type of variable pay system that was used in each 
organization. There may be a difference in disabled employees’ responses to variable pay 
depending on whether it is based on subjective measures (i.e. performance appraisals) versus 
objective measures (i.e. piece rate pay). The former arguably requires more trust between 
management and employees, in that performance measures must be seen as valid and reliable in 
the absence of verifiable data (Lawler, 2000). We also did not have detailed data on different 
facets of satisfaction with pay (i.e., satisfaction with pay level, pay structure, pay administration, 
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benefits). Although research shows that these elements of pay satisfaction are highly correlated, 
they are different (Heneman & Schwab, 1985). Future research should examine disabled 
employees’ reactions to various permutations of variable pay based on the extent to which the 
pay system is based on verifiable data, against different facets of pay satisfaction. Future 
research should also examine perceptions of fairness or justice as mediators in our model, as this 
is central to our theorizing, and other psychological frameworks position it as central to 
explaining employees’ pay satisfaction (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001; 
Crosby, 1976; Higgins, 1987).  
Third, the WERS does not provide information on the amount of variable pay that is 
earned by employees. It might be that disabled employees who trust management do so because 
they receive higher variable pay. The receipt of variable pay may therefore mediate the 
moderated relationship to explain why disabled employees who are paid based on variable pay 
and who trust in management have higher levels of pay satisfaction. The WERS also does not 
contain information on the average pay level in the firm; their relative pay may have implications 
for how employees feel about their pay. Future research should investigate these possibilities.  
A fourth limitation is that we were unable to test for the moderating effect of type of 
disability. Characteristics of a person’s disability, including its origin, conceal-ability, 
disruptiveness, dangerousness, and aesthetic qualities are associated with different responses 
from the public (Stone & Colella, 1996) and with different employee outcomes (Ren et al., 
2008). For instance, it is possible that our results may be stronger for visible versus invisible 
disabilities. It is also possible that some individuals may indicate that they are disabled but do 
not believe that they are stereotyped because their disability is invisible. Hence, the rationale for 
our hypotheses may not hold for such individuals. Moreover, our theorizing assumes that all 
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disabled employees respond similarly to variable pay, when there might be unique reactions 
based on personality traits (Cable & Judge, 1994). Future research should therefore collect more 
data on the abovementioned qualities of a person’s disability and examine their interactions with 
personality.  
Another restriction we faced in using the WERS is that we are unable to link individual 
managers with individual employees. This may be important in this context, as managers’ 
perceptions of an employee’s disability (i.e. their belief of the “cause” of the disability) may 
influence managers’ global perceptions of the disabled person. Instead, the WERS links the 
organization (not the manager) with employee respondents. We therefore suggest that future 
research examine how managers attribute disability at the dyadic level to determine whether this 
influences how decisions with regards to pay are made, and the reaction of disabled employees.  
Limitations also arise due to the size of our sample. For instance, the empirical analyses 
explained a relatively small amount of variance, as evidenced by the R2 statistics (from 0.03 to 
0.17). This is a typical concern of studies that use large samples, which have higher amounts of 
unobserved heterogeneity, relative to smaller ones. For instance, research that examines HRM 
practices using large datasets report similar statistics (e.g., Booth, Park, & Glomb, 2009 reported 
R2 statistics from .05 to .22; Curran & Walsworth, 2014 reported R2 statistics from .06 to .20). 
However, as Combs (2010) explained, using larger samples brings benefits; for instance, using a 
larger sample enables us to obtain higher external validity, reduce the chances of committing a 
Type 2 error, and provide better estimates of the “real world” in the UK.  
Practical Implications  
This study sends a clear message to organizations interested in raising employee pay 
satisfaction – trust in management and a firm-wide disability policy coupled with aligned HRM 
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practices – matters. In order to increase employees’ trust in management, organizations can take 
a two-pronged approach. First, they should encourage management, via effective role modeling, 
training, and/or reward strategies, to be trustworthy. Second, managers need to be perceived as 
trustworthy, by cultivating relationships with employees that are characterized by relational trust. 
For example, in the context of designing and managing an individual variable pay system, 
managers can be trustworthy by ensuring that appropriate metrics are used to measure 
performance, abstaining from making decisions based on personal biases, setting achievable 
targets, and providing constructive feedback. Managers can develop trusting relationships with 
employees by incorporating a participative approach to individual variable pay and fully 
articulating to employees the process by which individual variable pay decisions are made.  
Although trust in management is important regardless of disability status, the results of 
our study highlight the need for management to take particular care in ensuring that disabled 
employees trust management. Managers who value integrating disabled people into the 
workplace and who are willing to mentor disabled employees should be selected and rewarded 
for their efforts (Stone & Colella, 1996). Trust is likely to be especially important for disabled 
employees in the assignment of appropriate job duties and reasonable adjustments, and the trust 
that is cultivated between management and disabled employees may in fact constitute a different 
variant of trust. Managers must ensure that disabled people feel included in work related 
activities, especially given existing negative stereotypes and low performance expectations of 
disabled individuals (Ren et al., 2008; Stone & Colella, 1996). To do so, management should 
partner with the HRM department to train managers and employees on disability issues, highlight 
the achievements of disabled people, and organize networking events where all employees share 
an opportunity to meet (Colella, 1994; Stone & Colella, 1996). 
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The results of our research also suggest that HRM professionals play an important role in 
creating an environment in which disabled employees feel that they are treated fairly in relation 
to pay. HRM professionals need to be aware that an organizational policy without aligned HRM 
practices may have unintended consequences. HRM practitioners oftentimes need to lobby their 
position to senior management and to justify costs for HRM practices. This research provides a 
clear reason why firms should invest in disability-related HRM practices, especially when a 
formal policy is present. Our results caution against the belief that the institution of a policy 
regarding the treatment of disabled employees is a cure-all remedy; instead, the role of the HRM 
department becomes pivotal in realizing the potential of the policy to influence the attitudes of 
disabled employees.  
Conclusion  
Employers are now, more than ever, focused on attracting and retaining a diverse 
workforce. Although skilled, talented, and motivated to work, disabled individuals are oftentimes 
overlooked for jobs. Organizations need to be equipped with understanding how to connect with 
and support disabled employees in order to capitalize on this underutilized labor pool. Although 
the present study confirmed that disabled people are less satisfied with their pay than their 
nondisabled counterparts and the difference is larger under individual variable pay, the data also 
revealed that trust in management decreased the gap in pay satisfaction. Additionally, our results 
showed that when disability-related policy and practices are both present, the gap in pay 
satisfaction decreased. The major take-away for HRM professionals is that they need not disband 
individual variable pay systems based on the belief that it is disadvantageous for disabled people 
so long as they ensure that there is high trust in management and that there are aligned HRM 
practices with the firm’s policy on the treatment of disabled employees.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 15 
 
16 
1. Pay satisfaction 2.82 1.12               
   
  
   
  
 
2. Disabilitya .11 .31 -.06*       
         
3. Individual variable 
paya 
 .08 .27 .02 -.01      
         
4. Trust in 
management 
3.40 .93 .41* -.10* .02     
   
 
   
 
 
5. Disability policy a .81 .38 -.07* .02 .01 -.10*    
   
 
   
 
 
6. Genderb .58 .49 .08* .02 -.01 .14* .01            
7. Age 5.72 1.46 -.03 .14* -.06* -.02 -.01 -.03           
8. Income 6.98 2.52 -.01 -.01 .05* -.13* .07* -.28* .03          
9. Work hours per 
week 
33.34 12.49 -.11* -.01 .02 -.13* -.01 -.31* -.03* .61*  
 
 
   
 
 
10. Job tenure 3.71 1.01 -.01 .07* -.02 -.11* .01 .02 .43* .13* .01 
      
 
11. Marital statusc .67 .47 .03 .01 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.01 .25* .08* .01 
 
.13* 
      
12. Education .19 .39 -.03 -.04* .02 .02 .03 .05* -.15* .12* -.01 
 
-.14* 
-.01 
     
13. Base paya .93 .26 .01 0.02 -0.28* .01 .01 .02 .03 
 
.07* 
 
-.05* 
 
.03* .02 
 
.06* 
  
 
 
14.Union statusa 5.21 17.79 -.02 0.04* -0.04* -.05* .06* .01 .06* 
 
.04* 
 
-.01 
 
.07* .04* 
 
.01 
 
.03 
 
 
 
15. Organization size 4.54 1.74 -.03 0.05* 0.02 -.18* .36* -.05* .06* 
 
.19* 
 
.03 
 
.11* .02 
 
.05* 
 
.04* 
 
.13*  
 
16. Job evaluationa .35 .48 -.01 0.02 -0.01 -.01 .21* .09* .04* 
 
.09* 
 
-.08* 
 
.07* .01 
 
.09* 
 
.05** 
 
.13* .31* 
 
17. Diversity-related 
HRM practices 
0.25 0.32 -.01 .04 -.04* -.05* .27* .08* .07* 
 
.10* 
 
-.06* 
 
.04* .03 
 
.08* 
 
.05* 
 
.15* .38* 
 
.33* 
DISABILITY VARIABLE PAY TRUST 51 
18. Merit pay .24 .43 -.04* .01 .06* -.04 .02 .04 -.04* 
 
.06* 
 
-.02 
 
-.03 
-.01 
 
.07* 
 
.05* 
 
-.03 
.15* 
 
.13* 
Source: British 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). The sample means and standard errors are fully weighted to account for the complex survey design. 
Notes:a1=yes, 0=no; b1=female, 0=male; c1=married, 0=single; *p< .01 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Firm Characteristics 
Characteristics Mean  Std. Dev 
Company size ( log of total number of employees)  4.38 1.72 
Union status (percentage of employees who are members of a trade union) 6.43 19.40 
Job evaluation system ((1=Yes, 0=No) .42 .49 
Merit pay system (1=Yes, 0=No) .25 .44 
Diversity-related HRM practices .25 .32 
Have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity (1=Yes, 0=No) .91 .29 
Have a formal policy that explicitly mentions disability (1=Yes, 0=No) .80 .40 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability (1=Yes, 0=No) .42 .49 
Review recruitment and selection by disability (1=Yes, 0=No) .33 .47 
Monitor promotions by disability (1=Yes, 0=No) .18 .38 
Review promotion procedures by disability (1=Yes, 0=No) .19 .39 
Reviews relative pay rates by disability (1=Yes, 0=No) .10 .30 
Total number of organizations 1806 
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Table 3. Multilevel Regression analyses of individual variable pay, disability status, and trust in 
management on pay satisfaction (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5e 
Gender a .12*** .12*** .12*** .05** .12*** 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) 
      
Age .01 .01 .01 -.01 .01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
      
Income .06*** .06*** .06*** .06*** .06*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
      
Work hours per week -.02*** -.02*** -.02*** -.01*** -.02*** 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
      
Job tenure -.02* -.02* -.02* -.01* -.02* 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
      
Marriage status b .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 
 (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) 
      
Education c -.09** -.09** -.08** -.10* -.07*** 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
      
Base payd .01 .01 .03 .01 .03 
 (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) 
      
Union statusd -.01** -.01** -.01* -.01 -.01 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) 
      
Organization size -.01 -.01 -.01 .03*** -.01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
      
Job evaluation  system d -.04 -.04 -.04 -.05* -.02 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) 
      
Firm level merit pay -.04 -.04  -.04 -.03 -.06* 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
      
Disability d  -.18*** -.15*** -.03 -.17*** 
  (.04) (.04) (.11) (.05) 
      
Individual variable pay d   .14*** .06 .12* 
   (.05) (.16) (.07) 
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Notes:   a1=female, 0=male; b1=married, 0=single; c1= first degree or higher, 0=without first degree; d1=yes, 0=no 
*p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Employees n=11,210; workplaces n=1,806 
e Employees n= 9,453; workplaces n=1,548 
 
 
 
 
      
Disability X    -.37*** .42 -.56*** 
       Individual variable pay    (.12) (.38) (.17) 
      
Trust in management    .48***  
    (.01)  
      
Disability X    -.01  
      Trust in management    (.03)  
      
Individual variable pay X    .01  
      Trust in management    (.04)  
      
Disability X     -.21*  
       Individual variable pay X    (.12)  
      Trust in management      
      
Disability-related HRM         -.03  
      practices      (.05)    
      
Disability X     .03 
Disability-related HRM 
practices 
    (.11)      
      
Individual variable pay X     .05    
Disability-related HRM  
practices 
    (.15)      
      
Disability X      .29   
     Individual variable pay X     (.38)     
            Disability-related 
            HRM practices 
     
      
      
Constant 3.01*** 3.00*** 2.96*** 1.08*** 2.82*** 
 (.09) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.09) 
      
Overall R2 .02 .03 .03 .17 .03 
      
Δ R2 .02*** .01*** .01*** .14*** n/a 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model  
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Figure 2. The two-way interaction of individual variable pay and disability status on pay 
satisfaction 
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Figure 3. The three-way interaction of individual variable pay, disability status and trust in 
management on pay satisfaction  
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Figure 4. The three-way interaction of individual variable pay, disability status and disability-
related HRM practices on pay satisfaction when disability policy exists 
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